We consider whether reputation concerns can discipline the behavior of a long-lived selfinterested agent who has a monopoly over the provision of fiat money. We obtain that when this agent can commit to a choice of money supply, there is a monetary equilibrium where it never overissues. We show, however, that such equilibria do not exist when there is no commitment. This happens because the incentives this agent has to maintain a reputation for providing valuable currency disappear once its reputation is high enough. More generally, we prove that in the absence of commitment overissue happens infinitely often in any monetary equilibrium. We conclude by showing that imperfect memory can restore the positive result with commitment.
Introduction
Frictions in trade are necessary if money is to be valued as a medium of exchange. The standard approach to model this is to assume that trade is anonymous and decentralized and no record keeping is possible. Under these assumptions, a large body of work has shown that money is essential when its supply is exogenous. However, if the amount of money in circulation in an economy is determined by self-interested agents, the absence of record keeping can lead to the so-called "dynamic inconsistency" problem: if money has value, any agent with the ability to print money faces a temptation to overissue, as any deviation from a pre-specified plan of action is likely to go unnoticed. In other words, money may not be feasible if its supply is endogenous.
The way found by the literature to deal with the "dynamic inconsistency" problem, see Berentsen [5] , Cavalcanti et. al. [6] , Cavalcanti and Wallace [7] , and Martin and Schreft [18] for example, is to assume a form of partial record keeping: the behavior of note issuers can be publicly monitored. 1 This solution has two shortcomings. First, it leaves open the question of how this type of partial record keeping arises in the first place. Second, it is not robust to the introduction of monitoring costs, no matter how small, because of a free rider problem. Indeed, the success any technology that allows note issuers to be monitored has in disciplining their behavior depends on how many agents use it. If only a small number of agents do so, the punishment note issuers face if they overissue is insufficient to induce good behavior. However, if a large number of agents uses this technology, its effectiveness is not affected when a single agent stops using it. Therefore, if all agents have to pay a cost, no matter how small, to use it, there can be no situation where a large group of agents uses this technology in the first place. Otherwise, any such agent would have an incentive to stop using it and free ride on the social benefit it brings.
In this article we address the feasibility of fiat money when it is issued by a single self-interested agent, the bank, and its choice of money supply cannot be observed by the other agents in the economy. We do so in an environment where trade is decentralized and agents are anonymous and have heterogeneous preferences, so that there is a natural role for money. The absence of public monitoring means that agents can only learn about the bank's decisions from their private experience, i.e., information is decentralized. As a consequence, the monitoring of the bank's behavior is private and imperfect. This assumption about information is a natural one in an economy with decentralized trade.
The starting point of our analysis is a simple version of the model introduced in Kiyotaki and Wright [14] , modified in a number of ways. First, as indicated above, the money supply is privately determined by the bank in each period. Moreover, the bank can either be patient or impatient, and this is also its private information. Second, the other agents in the economy can now decide between staying in autarky or entering the market and transacting with the help of money. The bank's revenue from money issue in any period is proportional to how much new currency it prints and to the measure of agents who choose the market at that point in time. In particular, holding everything else constant, this revenue is higher if the bank overissues. Finally, autarky is always better than the market if money is always overissued, which happens when the bank is impatient, but the opposite is true when overissue never takes place.
Since the market is always worse than autarky when the bank is impatient, the patient bank faces a trade-off between short-run gains from overissue and long-run losses due to a decrease in its reputation for providing valuable currency. Indeed, if it overissues, the agents in the economy become more convinced that the bank they face is impatient, leading to a smaller revenue from money issue in future periods. The idea that reputation concerns may help solve the "dynamic inconsistency" problem is not new. Klein [15] considers an environment where such trade-off is present. In his model, however, this trade-off is assumed rather than derived, and it turns out that this has important consequences.
Notice that in general the bank's choice of money supply should affect both the frequency of trade meetings (the extensive margin) and the terms of trade in such meetings (the intensive margin). However, since in our environment money and goods are indivisible and there is an unit upper bound on money holdings, the only margin that is affected by the bank's decision is the extensive one. This simplifies the analysis considerably, but preserves the trade-off between reputation and short-run gains from overissue.
We first consider the case where the bank's choice of money supply in the first period is binding.
We show that in this case there is an equilibrium where the patient bank never overissues as long as it is sufficiently patient. The intuition for this result is simple. If the patient bank indeed never overissues, its reputation increases over time, which implies a steady stream of revenue from money issue. If, instead, the patient bank deviates and always overissues, its revenue from money issue increases in the short-run as a result of this. However, its reputation for being patient disappears over time, implying that its revenue from money issue decreases to zero in the long-run. If the patient bank cares enough about the future, this is sufficient to discourage it from deviating.
We then consider the no-commitment case, where the bank may change its behavior at any point in time. In this case, a policy for the patient bank where it never overissues is not time-consistent. Indeed, if the patient bank were never to overissue, its reputation for being patient, and thus providing valuable currency, would increase over time. Eventually a point would be reached where all agents in the market are so convinced that the bank they face is patient that any negative experience is attributed to bad luck. At this stage, the patient bank would rather overissue. The cost of doing so, a reduction in future revenue from money issue due to a decrease in its reputation, is almost zero, while the immediate benefit is substantial. Put differently, the "reputational" cost of overissue eventually becomes negligible, at which point the patient bank has a profitable deviation.
In light of this negative result, a natural question to ask is what type of equilibria are possible in the no-commitment case. For instance, is it possible to have a monetary equilibrium where the net gain of choosing the market is bounded away from zero when the bank is patient? We show that the same logic that rules out the no-overissue equilibrium also rules out these other equilibria.
A consequence of this result is that the patient bank must overissue infinitely many times in any monetary equilibrium.
The discussion so far suggests that a monetary equilibrium with no overissue may become feasible in an environment where the "reputational" cost of overissue is bounded away from zero.
Motivated by this, we modify the no-commitment case by assuming that in every period a fraction of the population becomes uninformed. We show that with this form of imperfect memory, an equilibrium where the patient bank never overissues is possible. The reason is that now the patient bank has always an incentive to look after its reputation: any time it overissues, the negative impact on its reputation is non-negligible.
Besides the literature on private money, this work also belongs to the literature that looks at reputation as a separation device. 2 A related paper in this literature is Mailath and Samuelson [16] , who consider an environment where monitoring is private and imperfect. A crucial difference is that in our environment the agents have an outside option, staying in autarky. In this regard, see Ely and Välimäki [10] , who consider a model of reputation where an outside option is present.
See also Moav and Neeman [19] , who study the interplay between memory and reputation.
The basic setup is developed in the next section and equilibrium is defined in Section 3. The full-commitment case, the case where the bank's choice of money supply in period one is binding, is considered in Section 4. The no-commitment case is considered in Section 5. The modification of the no-commitment case to include imperfect memory is analyzed in Section 6. Section 7 concludes and several appendices collect details and proofs that are omitted from the main text. 2 Mailath and Samuelson [17] discuss how this approach differs from the more standard approach to reputation that uses "Stackelberg" types (reputation as pooling device).
Basic Setup
Time is discrete and indexed by t. The economy has one large infinitely lived agent that we call the bank. Its discount factor δ is either zero or δ p > 0. In the first case we say the bank is impatient, while in the second one we say the bank is patient. The value of δ, however, is know to the bank only. The economy is also populated by a large number of small infinitely lived agents that we describe in the paragraphs that follow. For simplicity, we refer to these small agents as agents only.
The economy starts in t = 1 with a mass one of agents, all with the same prior belief θ 0 ∈ (0, 1) that the bank is patient. Moreover, in every t > 1 each agent born in the previous period gives birth to another agent, who inherits his parent's private history. As we are going to see later on, an agent's private history determines his belief about the bank's type. Hence, this last assumption implies that any agent born after t = 1 starts with the same belief about δ as his parent. An agent in his first period of life is said to be newly born.
All agents have the same discount factor β ∈ (0, 1). They also have a type that is determined when they first enter the economy. There are K > 2 of these types, one for each of the K types of goods that can be produced in the economy. The probability that a newly born agent is of the type k ∈ {1, . . . , K} is the same in every period, 1/K. Agents of type k can only consume a type k good, their so-called preferred good.
Production works as follows. All newly born agents receive a non-perishable endowment and make a once and for all decision between moving to autarky or entering the market. In autarky, an agent uses his endowment as an input to a production technology. In each period there is one production possibility, and each good produced yields utility a. In the market, an agent uses his endowment in the production of indivisible and perishable goods. An agent of type k can only produce, at a cost c per unit, a good of type k + 1( mod K), his so-called endowment good. Any agent in the market can hold at most one unit of either goods or money at any point in time.
The bank derives utility from the consumption of all K goods, but cannot produce any of them.
It has, however, the technology to print indivisible units of fiat money. These units provide no direct benefit, but can be offered in exchange for goods. More precisely, each newly born agent who enters the market is approached by the bank with a certain probability m, in which case he receives one unit of fiat money in exchange for one unit of his endowment good. The value of m is restricted to {m L , m H }, with From now on we say that the bank overissues when it chooses m H .
The market is organized as follows. There are K sectors, each one specialized in the exchange of one of the K available goods. Agents can identify sectors, but inside each sector they are randomly and anonymously matched in pairs. Since K > 2, there are no double coincidence of wants meetings. An agent, however, can trade his endowment good for money and use money to buy his preferred good. If an agent wants money, he goes to the sector that trades his endowment good and searches for an agent with money. If he has money, he goes to the sector that trades his preferred good and searches for an agent who can produce it. When a single coincidence of wants meeting takes place, the buyer transfers his money to the seller, and the latter produces one unit of his endowment good for the buyer, who consumes it to obtain utility u > c. 3 Any agent in the market faces one meeting per period. 4 Notice that we take the behavior of the agents and the bank in the market as given. It is possible, in a natural way, to model the market environment itself as a game involving the agents and the bank. This game has an equilibrium where the agents always exchange their endowment for one unit of money if approached by the bank and, as long as their discount factor is close enough to one, their behavior in the market is as described.
An implicit assumption in the above description of the market is that there is a positive measure of agents in it at any point in time. Since once in the market an agent does not leave it, a necessary and sufficient condition for this is that a positive measure of agents enters the market in period one. When the measure of agents in the market is zero, i.e., the market is "empty", money does not circulate and the market flow payoff is zero.
Suppose that in period t the choice of m by the bank is m t and the fraction of agents in the market with money is η t . When the market is empty in t, η t = 0. When the market is not empty in t, η t depends on m t and on the previous choices of m by the bank. In this section, however, we treat the sequences {m t } and {η t } as being independent of each other. Notice, though, that if η t > 0, then it must be that η k > 0 for all k > t. Moreover, when η t > 0, it must be that 3 This market structure is adopted for simplicity. It implies that any single coincidence of wants meeting involves a buyer with money and a seller without money, so that trade always occurs at such meetings. 4 A more natural assumption to make is that any agent in the market faces n > 1 meetings per period, where n is fixed. All the results we obtain in this article remain true under this alternative specification of the market environment. We don't pursue it since it brings no new insights and adds to the algebra and the notation.
Let w i,t denote the expected lifetime payoff for an agent in the market in period t with i ∈ {0, 1} units of money right before period t's market meeting. Then, if η t > 0,
Observe that an agent with money right before his market meeting in t has probability η t of meeting another agent with money, in which case no trade occurs. With probability 1 − η t he meets an agent without money, in which case trade occurs and he obtains utility u. A similar interpretation holds for the second equation. 5 We can rewrite (1) as
where
Solving this system of equations recursively, we obtain that if the market is not empty in t, then
If, on the other hand, the market is empty in t, then w t = β t w t , where t is the first period when the market is not empty and t = +∞ if the market is always empty.
Let v t be the lifetime expected reward from entering the market in period t and a(m) be the 2 × 1 row vector (m 1 − m). Assume, without loss of generality, that a newly born agent who decides to enter the market does not discount the time between this decision and his first meeting in the market. Then,
We denote the dependence of w i,t , w t , and v t on the sequence
When the market is not empty in period t and
In this case, we write v t = v(η).
Hence, a newly born agent who enters the market is always willing to accept one unit of money from the bank in exchange for his endowment good if he knows that the market is not empty.
Notice that if η
as m t and η t+1 are bounded below by 1/2. Consequently, when η t > 0, v t is a strictly decreasing function of η k with k ≥ t.
Consider now the particular case where
by w i (m) the expected lifetime utility from entering the market with i units of money. Since
, it is straightforward to see from (3) that
. 
Observe that the impatient bank, being myopic, always chooses m H , whether it can commit to its period one choice of m or not. Also observe that if a positive measure of agents enters the market in period 1 and the bank's choice of money supply is the same in every period, then η t is equal to this choice of m for all t. Consequently, the above assumption implies that if a positive measure of agents enters the market in the first period, then: (i) the market is always worse than autarky when the bank is impatient; (ii) the market is always better than autarky when the bank is patient and chooses m L in every period.
Notice that Assumption 1 also implies that there exists
Therefore, it is necessary that θ 0 ≥ θ M , otherwise no agent would ever enter the market. Indeed, we know from above that v t is a strictly decreasing function of η k for k ≥ t when η t > 0. Hence, since the market flow payoff is zero when the market is empty, the highest payoff a newly born agent can obtain if he chooses the market is v(m L ).
Equilibrium
Let H t denote the set of possible period t histories for the bank, so that H 1 = {∅} and
For any t > 1, the bank's history is the sequence of its previous choices of m together with the list of measures of agents who entered the market in the periods preceding t. A strategy for the bank is then a sequence M = {M t } of contingent plans, where
is the Borel measurable function mapping the bank's type and period t history into the probability that it chooses m L in period t. Since the impatient bank always overissues, we can restrict attention to strategies
We refer to the sequence M (δ p ) = {M t (δ p , · )} as the patient bank's strategy.
When making his market-autarky decision, the only piece of information a newly born agent has is the private history he inherits from his parent. 
is the Borel probability measure over H t such that
is the fraction of agents born in t with private histories in D ⊆ H t when the bank's discount factor is δ. The important point is that if the patient bank uses a pure strategy, then both its behavior over time and the aggregate behavior of the agents over time are deterministic.
Let m t be the patient bank's choice of m in t and µ t (ν t ) be the measure of newly born agents who enter the market in t when the bank is patient (impatient). Notice the change in notation. If the bank is impatient, the fraction of agents in the market in period t that have money is either zero, when the market is empty, or m H . On the other hand, if the bank is patient, this fraction, that we denote by α t , can change over time even when the market is not empty. Precisely, if
Moreover, there may be periods when the market is empty if the bank is of one of type, but not of the other. As a consequence, the belief an agent born in t has that the bank is patient depends not only on his private history h t ∈ H t , but also on the sequences {µ t }, {ν t }, and {m t }. Denote this belief by θ(h t ; {µ t }, {ν t }, {m t }). When there is no risk of confusion, we omit its dependence on the sequences {µ t }, {ν t }, and {m t }.
Let Ω = {0, 1} × {e, 0, 1} and define X t (δ; {µ t }, {ν t }, {m t }) to be the random variable on Ω such that if i, j ∈ {0, 1}, then:
Observe that m i t (1 − m t ) 1−i is the probability an agent born in t has of receiving i units of money from the patient bank if he enters the market, and that if α t > 0, then α j t (1−α t ) 1−j is the probability he has of meeting j agents with one unit of money in the market in the same period. When the bank is impatient, these probabilities are
We also omit the dependence of X t on {µ t }, {ν t }, and {m t } when there is no chance of confusion.
The belief θ(h t ) can then be computed by the following recursion. In the first period, θ(h 1 ) = h 1 , the prior belief that the bank is patient. Now fix t ≥ 1 and assume that θ(h t ) is defined for all
when the denominator is positive. When the denominator is zero, set θ(h t , π) equal to θ(h t ).
It is clear that in order to define an equilibrium where the patient bank uses a pure strategy, we have to take into account that: (i) the agents need the sequences {µ t }, {ν t }, and {m t } to compute the expected payoff from choosing the market, since this payoff depends on the belief that the bank is patient; (ii) the sequences {µ t }, {ν t }, and {m t } depend on the aggregate behavior of the agents (and the bank 
(c) The agents hold correct expectations about the sequences {m * t }, {µ * t }, and {ν * t }. In other words,
(d) The patient bank's behavior is sequentially rational. In particular,
(e) The decision rules of almost all agents are optimal given the belief updating rule Θ.
When the patient bank uses a mixed strategy, the evolutions of both m t and µ t are no longer necessarily deterministic. If this is the case, the belief a newly born agent has about the bank's type is not enough to determine his lifetime expected payoff from choosing the market. He also needs a (history dependent) conjecture about how m t and µ t are going to behave over time starting with his period of birth. This means that the equilibrium concept just introduced needs to be modified if one wants to consider this more general case. One exception is when the bank's behavior fails to be deterministic only off the equilibrium path, in which case the definition given above is appropriate.
We restrict attention to deterministic equilibria in this article.
Suppose σ * is an equilibrium and let N 1 (σ * ) = {t : µ * t > 0, ν * t > 0} be the set of periods where, regardless of the bank's type, a positive measure agents enters the market in this equilibrium.
Lemma 1 implies that
One consequence of this result is that the market is never completely informative about the bank's type in any equilibrium. Its proof is in Appendix B. is a non-monetary equilibrium. We finish this section with two other preliminary characterization results. The first one is a straightforward consequence of the assumption that the patient bank has always a myopic incentive to overissue. The second result follows from the first and implies that in any monetary equilibrium σ * , the set N 1 (σ * ) must be infinite. The proofs of both lemmas can be found in Appendix B.
Without the assumption that the bank prefers to overissue even when the measure of agents entering the market is zero, Lemmas 2 and 3 are not true. In particular, a monetary equilibrium where the measure of agents entering the market is zero after a finite number of periods becomes possible. The proof of Lemma 3 shows that all such equilibria must have the property that if t is the last period where a positive measure of agents enters the market, then m * t = m L for all t > t. The possibility of this type of monetary equilibrium does not alter the substance of our conclusions in Section 5. Moreover, we do not find these equilibria plausible. In particular, they are not robust to the following perturbation: if in any period after t a fraction of the newly born agents enters the market, the proof of Theorem 2 shows that the patient bank has a profitable deviation, no matter how small is. 6 
The Full Commitment Case
In this section we assume that the bank can commit to its period 1 choice of m, that is, once it chooses the value of m in the first period, it cannot change it afterwards. This is equivalent to using the equilibrium notion introduced in the previous section, but reducing the set of strategies
The proof of Theorem 2 does not depend on the assumption that agents start with a common prior.
and I {L} is the indicator function of {L}. We show that when δ p is close enough to 1, an equilibrium where the bank chooses M HL and money circulates exists. Moreover, the sequence {µ t } is bounded away from zero in this equilibrium, which implies that the subset of the population that transacts with money when the bank is patient does not die out over time.
For this, let Θ c be such that:
when d = M and ω ∈ {0, 1} × {e}, and
Recall that e denotes the event that the market is empty. Now define τ c = {τ c t } to be such that τ c t (·) ≡ d c t , where
Recall that θ M is the value of θ for which θv( The following fact is useful in the proof of Theorem 1. If {x t } is a convergent sequence in the real line with limit x ∞ , then 
p (ν c t + κ)m H is its payoff when it chooses m H , the desired result is a consequence of (8) together with the assumption that κ is infinitesimal.
The No Commitment Case
By restricting the bank to make a once and for all decision on the value of m in period 1, we rule out any considerations about the time-consistency of its behavior. In this section we investigate what happens when the bank can change its decision of m at the beginning of every period. In what follows, we refer to the belief that the bank is patient as the belief only and interpret the distribution of these beliefs among the newly born agents as the bank's reputation.
It turns out that for some purposes it is convenient to reinterpret the decision problems of the successive generations of agents in this economy in the following way. Associate to each family a myopic decision maker, the family lawyer, who is now responsible for the market-autarky decisions of the members of this family; i.e., in each t he decides whether the generation t member of the family he represents enters the market or not. Assume that the period t flow payoff and private history of a family lawyer are, respectively, the expected lifetime payoff and private history of the generation t member of his family. In particular, a strategy profile τ = {τ t } for the agents is also a strategy profile for the lawyers (and vice-versa): τ (i) = {τ t (i)} is the strategy for the lawyer representing the family indexed by i. With these assumptions, a family lawyer behaves over time in exactly the same way as the members of his family would behave if they were to make their market-autarky decisions on their own. Notice that the problem faced by the family lawyers is a two-armed bandit where one arm, the autarky, has known payoffs, and the other arm, the market, has (in principle) non-stationary payoffs.
We start by arguing (somewhat informally) that σ c cannot be an equilibrium in the no commitment case. To see why, notice first that autarky is absorbing in σ c . Hence, for the generation t member of a family to enter the market, it must be that all previous generations of his family did the same. Moreover, the market is informative about the bank's type in this equilibrium. Therefore, if the bank is patient, a fraction close to one of the agents who enter the market in t have beliefs very close to one when t is sufficiently large. 8 In particular, for each k ∈ N there existst ∈ N such that for a fraction close to one of the families whose generationt members choose the market, their next k generations do the same whether the patient bank chooses m L int or not. In other words, the patient bank's reputation is so high at this point that its choice of money supply int has a negligible impact on its revenue from money issue in the next k periods. Consequently, by choosing k large enough, the patient bank has a profitable deviation int.
Notice that the above argument relies on the fact that autarky is absorbing in σ c . It is easy to show that if we modify τ c in σ c to allow the agents to randomize when indifferent between the market and autarky, then σ c remains an equilibrium in the full commitment case (as long as the sequences {µ c t } and {ν c t } are changed accordingly), but autarky is no longer absorbing. 9 However, the market is still informative about the bank's type, and so the measure of newly born agents who are indifferent between the market and autarky must converge to zero over time. Indeed, if this is not the case, then there is a positive measure of family lawyers who send an infinite number of members of their families to the market, but who are indifferent between the market and autarky in infinitely many periods, a contradiction. 10 Hence, the reasoning of the previous paragraph is also valid in this case. 
Now observe that if
In this case, the sequence {µ * t } t∈N 1 (σ * ) is bounded away from zero. A consequence of this fact is that m * t = m L infinitely many times in N 1 (σ * ), otherwise {α t * } converges to m H . This, in turn implies that there is a profitable deviation for the patient bank. The existence of such a deviation follows from a reasoning similar to the one used to argue that the patient bank has a profitable deviation in σ c .
The lack of commitment implies that in any monetary equilibrium, the gain v * t − v A from choosing the market cannot be bounded away from zero in N 1 (σ * ). This does not mean that this gain necessarily converges to zero in this set, which would be the case if lim sup t∈N 1 (σ * ) v * t = v A . What prevents this more negative result is the existence of an outside option for the agents. In periods where the gain from entering the market is small, even small changes in the patient bank's reputation can have relatively large effects on its revenue from money issue, as the market-autarky decision is very knife-edge. This has the potential of disciplining the patient bank's behavior to a certain extent. 11 Not enough, however, to prevent the fraction of agents with money in the market from eventually becoming greater than m L in any monetary equilibrium, which is a consequence of the result that follows.
Proof: Let α * t be the fraction of agents in the market in period t with money when the bank is patient. Since a(m)B(η) = a(η) for all m, η ∈ (0, 1),
Suppose then, by contradiction, that N 1 (σ * , m H ) is finite. Since α * t can only change values when
Since v * t is strictly decreasing in α * k for k ≥ t, the sequence {v * t } t∈N 1 (σ * ) is non-constant and
Imperfect Memory
The analysis so far suggests that in order to have an equilibrium where the patient bank never overissues there must be something that prevents its reputation among the newly born agents from increasing too much when it always chooses m L . Put differently, we need a mechanism that provides the patient bank with the incentive to always invest in its reputation by never choosing m H .
With this in mind, we modify our environment by assuming that in any period there is a probability ρ > 0 that a newly born agent does not inherit his parent's private history. Instead, this agent's market-autarky decision is based on his prior belief that the bank is patient, that we assume to be θ 0 . In this way, regardless of what the patient bank does, there is always a positive measure of newly born agents for whom its reputation is not high. The equilibrium notion we use is still the one introduced in Section 3. We only have to change the definition of H t for t > 1 to incorporate the fact that memory is imperfect. Now, when t > 1, 
where Θ c is the belief updating rule of Section 4, and define τ * = {τ * Theorem 3. Suppose that: 
(ii) expectations are (trivially) satisfied, and (iii) agents behave optimally given the bank's behavior and the behavior of the other agents. Hence, we just need to check that the patient bank has no profitable one-shot deviation if δ p is sufficiently close to one. We ignore κ, as it is infinitesimal. 
Because memory is imperfect, for each h ∈ H k there exists a distributionλ k (h) such that
Consider an agent born in k with belief θ. For each t ≥ 1, denote by ξ t,k (m, θ) the probability that the generation k + t member of this agent's family enters the market in k + t if (i) the patient bank chooses m ∈ {m L , m H } in k and m L from k + 1 on, and (ii) private histories are always transmitted from one generation to the next. Now let φ t,k (m, θ) be the same probability when private histories can fail to be transmitted. Then,
Indeed, with probability (1 − ρ) t private histories are always passed from one generation to the next, while with probability ρ(1 − ρ) τ the last period before k + t where private histories are not passed from one generation to the following is k + (t − 1) − τ , with τ ∈ {0, . . . , t − 1}.
Observe ξ t,k is independent of k, since under σ * all newly born agents follow the same cutoff belief strategy and the market environment is stationary. Therefore, the same is true for the probabilities φ t,k . Because of this, we omit k from both ξ t,k and φ t,k in what follows. Let ζ be the
where the second equality follows from (10) . Now observe that for each
which implies that
for each k ∈ N and all h ∈ H k . It is then enough to show that D k is negative for all k ∈ N.
In Appendix D we prove that
i.e., the patient bank's loss of revenue from money issue due to a worse reputation increases over time. Hence,
that a newly born agent who enters the market with belief θ 0 ends his first period of life with an updated belief less than θ M only when he receives money from the bank and faces an agent with money in his first market meeting. Therefore,
, and so
The desired result now holds since the left-hand side of the above inequality converges to zero when δ p converges to one. 12 
Conclusion
This work contributes to the literature on endogenous money. It addresses the feasibility of fiat money when its supply is determined by a single self-interested agent (the bank). This is done in an environment where trade is decentralized and agents are anonymous and have heterogenous preferences, so that money is essential. We depart from previous work by assuming that: (i) there is uncertainty about the bank's preferences, so that there is a role for reputation; (ii) there is no technology that allows the bank to be publicly monitored, so that information is decentralized and its flow is constrained by the same technology that hinders trade. The main feature of our model is that the bank faces a trade-off between short-run gains from overissue and long-run losses due to a decrease in its reputation for providing valuable currency.
We show that if the patient bank can commit to a choice of money supply, then a monetary equilibrium where it does not overissue exists as long as it is sufficiently patient. This equilibrium, however, is not time-consistent when the patient bank cannot commit to a plan of action. The reason for this is that the patient bank's incentives to maintain a good reputation by not overissuing disappear once this reputation becomes too high. In other words, the trade-off between gains from overissue and reputation is only significant for moderate reputations. Following this insight, we
show that if memory is imperfect, the patient bank's incentive to maintain a good reputation never disappears, and so a monetary equilibrium with no overissue is possible. The shortcoming of this approach is that even though reasonable, it is somewhat ad-hoc.
An interesting question is whether there are other mechanisms that can discipline the bank's behavior. In this regard, we believe that there are two possible directions for study. First, it may be that inconvertibility is at the root of the overissue problem. As Friedman and Schwartz point out, "historically, producers of money have established confidence by promising convertibility into some dominant money, generally, specie. Many examples can be cited of fairly long-continued and successful producers of private moneys convertible into specie" [11, p. 45] . 13 The second alternative, which we are currently investigating, is to introduce competition among money issuers. According to von Hayek, one of its main advocates, "convertibility is a safeguard necessary to impose upon 12 Notice that ρ ∞ t=1 (1 − ρ) t converges to 1 when ρ converges to zero from above. 13 The reason why convertibility may work together with reputation is that its failure can act as a signal that the bank is impatient, thus disciplining the behavior of the patient bank. a monopolist, but unnecessary with competing suppliers who cannot maintain themselves in the business unless they provide money at least as advantageous to the user as anybody else" [13, p. 111].
is possible for the patient bank. We divide the argument in three parts.
t ∈ N, is the measure of families for which k of its members choose the market up to period t and n ∞ (k|δ) = n ∞ (k|i, δ)di is the measure of families for which k of its members enter the market.
Notice that for each k, δ, and i, p t (k|i, δ) → p ∞ (k|i, δ). Hence, n t (k|δ) → n ∞ (k|δ) by the dominated convergence theorem. Since
, where n 0 (k|δ) ≡ 0 by definition, it must be that ∞ k=1 n ∞ (k), the measure of families for which only a finite number of their members enter the market, is less than one. Otherwise, {ν * t } converges to zero. Denote this set of families by I. To finish this step, notice that N 1 (σ * , m L ) must be an infinite set. Suppose not. Because Step 3 for some k ∈ N, then χ t (B|i, δ) = p t (k + 1|i, δ) for all t ∈ N, and so {χ t (B|i, δ)} also converges to 15 An intuition for this result is as follows. Consider an individual who tosses a coin infinitely main times, and this coin is either fair or biased towards heads. Even if this bias changes over time, as long as the limiting frequency of heads in the biased coin is greater than 1/2, this individual will still learn the coins' true type.
χ ∞ (B|i, δ). Hence, {χ t (B|i, δ)} converges to χ ∞ (B|i, δ) for all B ∈ C, the algebra generated by B. Theorem, see [9] , now tell us that for all > 0 there exists a set I of families of measure at least 1 − such that {χ t (i, δ)} converges to χ ∞ (i, δ) uniformly on I . For our purposes, we can then assume that {χ t (i, δ)} converges uniformly to χ ∞ (i, δ) on [0, 1].
Let µ be a lower bound for {µ * t } t∈N 1 (σ * ) and choose K ∈ N such that To finish, let t ∈ N 1 (σ * , m L ) be such that t > t and set κ equal to zero (we can do so since κ is infinitesimal). The patient bank's lifetime payoff from sticking to its prescribed strategy from period t on is
If, instead, it does a one-shot deviation in t, its lifetime payoff is at least 
To finish observe that the term in brackets in the above expression is non-positive if, and only if,
The proof of Lemma 4 can be easily modified to cover the more general case where each agent in the market faces n meetings per period.
